Internal report paints dire picture of U.S. Capitol security

Mary Clare Jalonick
The Associated Press

WASHINGTON — Shields that shattered upon impact. Weapons too old to use. Missed intelligence in which future insurrectionists warned, “We get our president or we die.”

As Congress pushes for a return to normalcy months after the Jan. 6 riot at the Capitol, a damning internal report about the deadly siege is painting a dire picture of the Capitol Police’s ability to respond to threats against lawmakers. The full report obtained by The Associated Press before the department’s watchdog testifies at a House hearing casts serious doubt on whether the police would be able to respond to another large-scale attack.

The Capitol Police have so far refused to publicly release the report — prepared in March and marked as “law enforcement sensitive” — despite congressional pressure. Democratic Rep. Zoe Lofgren of California, who heads the House Administration Committee, said last month that she found the report, along with another she had reviewed, “detailed and disturbing.” The inspector general who prepared it, Michael A. Bolton, was scheduled to testify before Lofgren’s committee Thursday.

The Capitol Police said in a statement Wednesday that the siege was “a pivotal moment” in history that showed the need for “major changes” in how the department operates, but it was “important to note that nearly all of the recommendations require significant resources the department does not have.”

Widespread deficiencies: Bolton found that the department’s deficiencies were — and remain — widespread: Equipment was old and stored badly; officers didn’t complete required training; and there was a lack of direction at the Civil Disturbance Unit, which exists to ensure that legislative functions of Congress are not disrupted by civil unrest or protest activity.

The report also focuses on several pieces of missed intelligence, including an FBI memo sent the day before the insurrection that then-Capitol Police Chief Steven Sund told lawmakers he never saw. The memo warned of threatening online postings by Trump backers, including one comment that Congress “needs to hear glass breaking, doors being kicked in” and blood being spilled.

“Get violent … Stop calling this a march, or rally, or a protest,” read one post recounted in the memo. “Go there ready for war. We get our President or we die. NOTHING else will achieve this goal.”

A separate report prepared by the Department of Homeland Security in December alerted the police to messages on a blog where people appeared to be planning for

Jan. 6. One online post included a map of tunnels under the Capitol used by lawmakers and staff. “Take note,” the message said.

An extensive timeline of that day included in Bolton’s report describes the movements of the Capitol Police as officers scrambled to evacuate lawmakers. It details previously unknown conversations among officials as they disagreed on whether National Guard forces were necessary. It quotes an Army official telling Sund, after the insurrectionists had broken in, that “we don’t like the optics of the National Guard standing in a line at the Capitol.”

Department in crisis: The riot has pushed the Capitol Police force toward a state of crisis, with officers working extra shifts and forced overtime to protect the Capitol. The acting chief, Yogananda Pittman, received a vote of no confidence from the union in February, reflecting widespread distrust among the rank and file who were left exposed and injured as the violent mob descended on the building. Morale has plummeted.

The entire force is also grieving the deaths of three of their own. Officer Brian Sicknick collapsed and died after engaging with protesters on Jan. 6. Officer William “Billy” Evans was killed April 2 when he was hit by a car that rammed into a barricade outside the Senate. Evans laid in honor in the Capitol Rotunda on Tuesday.

A third officer, Howard Liebengood, died by suicide in the days after the insurrection.

Equipment issues: Bolton found that in many cases, department equipment had expired but was not replaced. Some was more than 20 years old. Riot shields that shattered upon impact as the officers fended off the violent mob had been improperly stored. Weapons that could have fired tear gas were so old that officers didn’t feel comfortable using them. Other weapons that could have done more to disperse the crowd were never staged, and those who were ordered to get backup supplies to the front lines could not make it through the crowd.

In other cases, weapons weren’t used because of “orders from leadership,” the document says. Those weapons — designed to disperse rather than kill — could have helped the police repel the rioters, according to the report.

The report faults the Civil Disturbance Unit for a lack of preparation. Guidance was lacking for when to activate the unit, how to issue gear, what tactics to use and how to lay out the command structure. Some policies hadn’t been updated in more than a decade and there was no firm roster of who was even in the division.